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On May 25, 1983, the Supreme Court ruled 8-1 that the United States Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) had authority to deny tax-exempt status to Bob Jones University, Goldsboro
Christian School, and other private and religious schools with racially discriminatory educational
policies. The Court relied on the statute’s broad purpose and placed significant weight on
Congress’ failure to enact legislation to overturn the IRS policy. A complete account of the
legislative history, provided here, both supports and undercuts the Court’s opinion. More
importantly, this story provides an account of the dynamic interaction among a Supreme Court
critical of racial integration, a Congress divided on this issue, and a presidency at war with itself.
In the end, the story suggests that Bob Jones may have a limited role in shaping interpretive
methodology, but that the case reveals how all three branches of government (as well as the
public) interact to shape a statute’s meaning.

The Story of
Bob Jones University v. United States:
Race, Religion, and Congress’
Extraordinary Acquiescence
Olati Johnson
“We’re in a bad fix in America when eight evil old men and one vain and foolish woman
can speak a verdict on American liberties.” These were the words of Bob Jones III on May 25,
1983, the day after the Supreme Court ruled 8-1 that the United States Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) had authority to deny tax-exempt status to Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian
School because of their racially discriminatory admissions policies. In the preceding two years,
the Bob Jones case had been repeatedly featured in newspaper reports, nightly news segments,
and heated public debates. Congress and the executive branch had weighed in on the case and, in
the preceding decade, their actions and inactions had helped shape the larger debate surrounding
tax exemptions for private schools. In announcing its decision, the Supreme Court would finally
confront the question. The civil rights community and others would celebrate the decision but,
for many religious groups, the Court would replace the IRS and Congress as the new villain,
blamed for infringing the role of Congress and for making policy rather than interpreting law.
Like Bob Jones III, observers often depict the case as a clash of two competing rights:
racial equality versus religious free exercise. Yet, if these rights find expression in the case, it is
through statutory interpretation. The decision is occupied far less with constitutional doctrine
than with determining the plain meaning and purpose behind the tax-exemption statute, and the
proper scope of the IRS’ power. Those who have studied the Court’s statutory analysis are often
critical of its failure to adhere to the statutory text and its reliance on congressional inaction. But
understanding the historical context—how the IRS, the Congress, the White House, and the
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courts became embroiled in questions involving racial discrimination and private schools—
provides, if not a complete defense, crucial context for understanding the Court’s decision.
SEGREGATED PRIVATE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND THE TAX CODE
The controversy in Bob Jones had its roots in efforts by civil rights groups to curb the
growth of racially discriminatory private schools. In 1970, in a reversal of policy, the IRS
announced that private schools practicing racial discrimination in admissions and other school
programs would no longer receive tax exemptions.1 Just three years earlier, the IRS had declared
that it lacked legal basis for denying charitable qualification to segregated private schools unless
they received state aid.2 The statute that the IRS would argue permitted this new interpretation,
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, was not new, long predating the controversy
over the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools. To understand how the IRS
came to its decision requires understanding the origins of the charitable exemption, and the
dramatic legal and social changes of the 1950s and 1960s that would make the charitable
exemption central to debates over racial integration and religious autonomy.
THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION
The notion that charitable corporations should be exempt from tax is older than the
federal income tax itself. Many American colonial governments exempted churches from tax by
either constitution or custom, and by the nineteenth century many states did so by statute.3 State
governments also exempted educational organizations from taxes as early as the 1700s.4 Tax
exemptions for organizations serving the poor and needy date from the nineteenth century. By
1894, when Congress enacted its first corporate income tax, most states granted tax exemptions
in favor of religious and educational institutions, as well as institutions serving the poor.5
Following longstanding state practice, Congress exempted from the income tax “corporations,
companies and associations organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious or
educational purposes.”6 In offering an amendment excluding such corporations from taxation,
Congressman Henry Tucker (D-Va.) stated only that the provision was intended to ensure that
“educational and charitable institutions not suffer under the bill.”7
In 1895, the Supreme Court issued an opinion that strongly suggested that Congress
lacked power to enact a general federal corporate income tax unless it was apportioned among

1

See IRS News Releases (July 10, 1970), No. 1052 (July 19, 1970), 7 CCH 1980 Stan. Fed. Tax. Rep. ¶¶ 6790,
6814.
2
See Internal Revenue Service, General Counsel Memorandum, In Re Charitable Qualification of Segregated
Schools (Aug. 1, 1967).
3
See Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History
and Underlying Policy, in Research Papers Sponsored by the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs
2027-28 (1977), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ (last visited DATE).
ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/31/88/62.pdf.
4
See, e.g., Province Laws 1706-07, C.6 § 2.
5
See Belknap, supra note 3, at 2025, 2030.
6
See Act of Aug. 15, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 553 (taxing “all corporations organized for profit”); Belknap, supra
note 3, at 2025.
7
Belknap, supra note 3, at 2031.
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the states.8 To comply with that decision, Congress in 1909 imposed a more limited, special
excise tax on for-profit organizations, again exempting “religious, charitable [and] educational
corporations.” The exemption was limited to nonprofit corporations.9 After the Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution in 1913 gave Congress the power to levy an income tax without
apportionment among the states, Congress readopted and expanded the exemptive language of
the 1909 statute, adding “scientific” to the list of exempt organizations.10 In 1917, Congress
allowed individuals to claim tax deductions for charitable contributions.11 In 1919, Congress
added organizations addressing “cruelty to animals or children.”12 And, in 1921, Congress
expanded the definition of corporations to include “any community chest fund or foundation.”13
That same year, Congress included “literary” in the list of exempt nonprofit corporations.
By the time Bob Jones arrived at the Supreme Court, section 501(c)(3) exempted from
tax “[c]orporations, and any community chest fund or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition … or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals.” Section 170(a) of the tax code provided deductions
for “charitable contributions,” defined in 170(c) as contributions to corporations “organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes.”
THE MEANING OF “CHARITABLE”
The legislative history of section 501(c)(3) tells us little about whether Congress sought
to impose a common-law meaning of charitable—that is that an organization have a function of
promoting the public welfare—or whether it used the term more narrowly to mean organizations
providing relief to the poor. A sponsor of the 1909 statute described exempt organizations as
“devoted exclusively to the relief of suffering, to the alleviation of our people, and to all things
which commend themselves to every charitable and just impulse,” supporting the broader
conception.14 In reauthorizing the tax exemption for charitable nonprofits in 1938, the House
committee report said the exemption is justified because “the Government is compensated for the
loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by
appropriations from public funds.”15
The IRS’ regulations dating from 1923 interpreted charitable in the popular and not
common-law sense as applying to organizations operated “for the relief of the poor.”16 In 1954,
however, the Treasury Department published regulations stating that the statute employed
“charitable” in its “generally accepted legal sense,” that is to import common-law meanings of
“charitable.”17 At the same time, the regulations suggested that organizations delineated under
8

See Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
See ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, § 38 (1909).
10
See ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166, § 11G(a)[2] (1913).
11
See ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, Title XII, § 1201(2) (1917).
12
See ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, § 231 (1919).
13
See ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, § 231 (1921).
14
44 Cong. Rec. 4150 (1909).
15
H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938).
16
I.T. 1800, II-2C.B. 152, 153 (1923). In subsequent years, the Treasury Department promulgated regulations
defining “charitable” as organizations that provide “for the relief of the poor.” Treas. Reg. § 111 (1943).
17
Treas. Reg. § 150 (c) (3), (1)(d)(2), (1)(d)(1)(ii) (1959).
9
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section 501(c)(3) were presumptively charitable and need not separately satisfy the common-law
test. Almost two decades later, however, the IRS would take the position that presumptively
exempt organizations must satisfy common-law notions of charity, and it would do so in the
context of racially discriminatory private schools.
TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR SEGREGATED PRIVATE SCHOOLS
The IRS’ policy would be forged in the decades following the Supreme Court’s decision
in Brown v. Board of Education, which declared state-imposed racial segregation in public
schools unconstitutional.18 Ten years after Brown, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Title VI of which forbade racial segregation and discrimination in schools that received federal
funding. Title VI reflected a principle that federal dollars should not be used to subsidize
segregation.19
The end of formal, de jure segregation, however, did not spell the end to informal, de
facto school segregation. One strategy white parents used to resist integration was to flee the
public school system. In the years immediately following Brown, thousands of white children
flocked to newly created private schools, leaving a minority of white students in many public
school districts. In some communities, the white student body moved en masse to a new private
school, taking the indicia of the old schools, such as the school colors, symbols, and mascots.20
Pledging massive resistance, many Southern state governments encouraged establishment of
private schools, enacting legislation mandating or allowing the closing of public schools to resist
desegregation or providing state tax credits and tuition grants to students attending private
schools.21
As a result, private Southern schools grew exponentially, particularly after passage of
Title VI, which put federal pressure on school systems to desegregate.22 One hundred and sixtyeight private schools opened in Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and
South Carolina between 1964 and 1967.23 Most were openly segregationist and operated by
secular organizations.24 White citizen’s councils, for instance, operated more than 150 all-white
“segregation academies” in the South, serving more than 9,000 students.25
In the 1960s, Christian evangelical churches, which were expanding exponentially at the
time, began opening segregated academies and, by the 1970s, Christian private schools would

18

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
20
See David Nevin & Robert E. Bills, The Schools That Fear Built: Segregationist Academies in the South 14, 25
(1976).
21
See United States Commission on Civil Rights, Discriminatory Religious Schools & Tax Exempt Status 4 & n.15
(Dec. 1982).
22
See United States Senate, Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity [hereinafter Select Committee]
193 (Comm. Print 1972) (statement of Reese Cleghorn, Director, Leadership Project, Southern Regional Council,
Atlanta, Georgia, (July 1, 1970)).
23
Id. at 1932.
24
See Nevin & Bills, supra note 20, at 12-13 (1976).
25
See Select Committee, supra note 22, at 1933 (statement of Reese Cleghorn).
19
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outnumber the secular schools.26 The schools stemmed from community reaction to increased
secularism in public schools, such as the banning of school prayer, as well as from resistance to
integration.27 Yet racial beliefs and religion became intermingled in the mission and founding
concepts of some of the religious schools, leading some observers to claim that “Christian
schools and segregation academies are almost synonymous.”28
This rise in segregated academies and the adoption of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act provided the backdrop for the IRS’ decision on October 15, 1965, to suspend action on
applications for tax-exempt status. Yet, after two years of study, the IRS issued a revenue ruling
on August 2, 1967, concluding that private, segregated schools could be denied tax exemption
only where “[s]tate action for constitutional purposes” was found.29
THE GREEN LITIGATION
Black parents in Mississippi challenged the IRS’ policy. The year that Congress enacted
Title VI, Mississippi authorized tuition grants to allow white children to attend private schools.
That year two new private schools opened in school districts facing court-ordered desegregation.
By 1967, forty-nine new private schools had opened in Mississippi, all but one of which was all
white.30
In 1969, a district court declared Mississippi’s tuition grant program unconstitutional,31
but, in the absence of any state assistance or support, these private schools would continue to
qualify for federal tax-exempt status. The Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
(LCCR), founded in 1963,32 challenged the policy. Representing five black families in Holmes
County, Mississippi, LCCR claimed that the IRS’ policy violated constitutional and statutory
prohibitions on state aid to racially discriminatory organizations, as well as section 501(c)(3). A
three-judge court ruled in plaintiffs’ favor, preliminarily enjoining the IRS from granting
additional tax-exempt letters to Mississippi private schools.33
IRS RESPONSE: A NEW POLICY ON SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
The IRS did not wait until the entry of a permanent injunction to alter its policy. The
Treasury Department had come under increased pressure by some in Congress and by civil rights
groups to change its policy on private schools. The Senate Select Committee on Equal
Educational Opportunity chaired by Senator Walter Mondale (D-Minn.) held hearings in July
1970 that featured critics of the IRS’ exemption policy. Top officials within the Nixon
26

See Paul Boyer, The Evangelical Resurgence in 1970s American Protestantism, in Rightward Bound: Making
America Conservative in the 1970s 33 (Bruce J. Schulman & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2008) (describing the rise of
evangelicalism in the 1970s).
27
See Nevin & Bills, supra note 20, at 21, 25-27.
28
Joseph Crespino, Civil Rights and the Religious Right, in Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the
1970s 96 (2008).
29
7 CCH 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ¶6734.
30
Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (D.D.C 1970).
31
Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm’n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Miss. 1969).
32
See Charles A. Lester, The History of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 1963-2003, available
at http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/about?id=0003 (last visited DATE).
33
Green, 309 F. Supp. at 1137-38.
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administration were divided for several months on whether to change the policy.34 While the
secretary of Health and Education and Welfare (HEW) favored changing the policy, President
Nixon, who had wooed Southern voters in the 1968 election, initially appeared to support
maintenance of the existing policy. By July 1970, however, President Nixon changed his mind,
supporting the denial of tax exemptions to private segregated schools.35 In mid-July 1970, five
months after the Green court’s preliminary injunction, the IRS issued two news releases stating
that it would no longer allow tax exemptions for private schools unless they announced a racially
nondiscriminatory policy as to students.36
On June 30, 1971, the Green court granted a permanent injunction preventing the IRS
from issuing tax exemptions to segregated Mississippi private schools. Authoring the opinion for
the three-judge panel, Judge Harold Leventhal reasoned that segregated private schools were not
“charitable” within the meaning of the public law because they operated contrary to federal
public policy against racial discrimination.37 The court also rejected the constitutional freedomof-association claims raised by a group of intervening white families.38 The intervenors appealed
the case to the Supreme Court, where it was summarily affirmed.39
A few months later, the IRS published a revenue ruling essentially adopting the reasoning
of the Green court.40 Private schools that discriminated on the basis of admission in the
administration of educational and other school-administered programs could not be considered
charitable within the meaning of sections 501(c)(3) or 170(a). Both provisions incorporated
common-law notions that charitable trusts could not be illegal or contrary to public policy. While
private discrimination in schools was not illegal, “federal policy against racial discrimination is
well-settled,” as reflected in judicial pronouncements such as Brown and Title VI.
The following year, the IRS issued a revenue ruling outlining the guidelines for
determining whether a school’s admissions policy was nondiscriminatory, and providing
information on model methods for publicizing racially nondiscriminatory policies.41
CONGRESSIONAL REACTION
The IRS’ actions elicited conflicting responses from Congress. The Senate Select
Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity (noted above) held new hearings after the IRS
changed its policy. Chairman Mondale criticized the Nixon administration’s efforts to enforce
the new policy as meager, calling its actions a “complete hoax.”42 The final committee report

34

See Peter Milius, US to Tax Segregated Academies, Wash. Post, July 11, 1970, at A1; Select Committee Hearings,
supra note 22, at 1941.
35
See Boyer, supra note 26 at 94-95.
36
IRS News Releases (July 10, 1970), No. 1052 (July 19, 1970), 7 CCH 1980 Stan. Fed. Tax. Rep. ¶¶ 6790, 6814.
37
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1160 (D.D.C 1970).
38
Id. at 1168.
39
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
40
See Rev. Rul. 71-447.
41
See IRS Rev. Proc. 72-54, 2 C.B. 834 (1972).
42
See Select Committee, supra note 22, at 1931 et seq.; see also id. at 2026, 2017-26.
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issued in 1972 recommended that the IRS and the Department of Education take strong,
meaningful steps to enforce the IRS policy.43
Others in Congress were less content with the IRS’ position. Along with Senator Strom
Thurmond (R-S.C.), Senator James Allen (D-Ala.) decried the IRS’ decision on the Senate floor,
terming the decision “unfair,” “heartless,” and “threaten[ing to] the very existence of private
schools in the South.”44 Joined by senators from Mississippi and Alabama, Allen immediately
introduced legislation to overturn the policy.45 In 1970-71, members of Congress introduced bills
in both chambers to thwart the IRS’ implementation of the exemption policy. A typical bill
sought to prevent the IRS from revoking the tax exemption of a private school in the absence of a
judicial finding that the school had racially discriminatory admissions practices.46 Members
introduced similar bills in 1973 and 1975—fewer than in the preceding years and with fewer cosponsors. The bills were referred to the relevant committees, but never received hearings.
By the late 1970s, the IRS’ efforts to strengthen enforcement of the tax-exemption policy
finally produced a legislative response. In 1975, the IRS issued a revenue ruling creating stricter
guidelines for determining whether a school was in fact nondiscriminatory.47 Among other
requirements, the guidelines required that a school include a nondiscrimination policy in its
charter, brochures, and catalogues; publicize its policy by public notice broadly to the
community; maintain racially nondiscriminatory policies with respect to employing staff; operate
all scholarships and loans on a racially nondiscriminatory basis; and keep data on the racial
composition of its student body, faculty, administrative staff, and the scholarships and loans
awarded. Schools were required to annually certify that they had complied with the
requirements, and the IRS could revoke the exempt status of noncomplying schools. Also in
1975, the IRS adopted a revenue ruling that made clear that the guidelines on racial
discrimination applied to private schools operated by churches.48
Criticism by the United States Commission on Civil Rights and the Civil Rights Division
of the Department of Justice led the IRS to adopt even stronger guidelines.49 In July 1976, the
plaintiffs in Green reopened that litigation, alleging that the IRS had failed to comply with the
court’s injunction and that racially discriminatory private schools in Mississippi were receiving
tax exemptions. A week later, parents of black children attending public schools in seven states
undergoing desegregation filed a nationwide class action in Wright v. Regan. The Wright
43

See Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, Toward Equal Educational Opportunity 269
(Francesco Cordasco ed., 1974).
44
See 116 Cong. Rec. 21,120-22 (July 14, 1970) & 24,427-33 (July 15, 1970) (statement of Sen. Allen); 116 Cong.
Rec. 24,836, 24,906-07 (July 17, 1970) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
45
See S.335, 91st Cong. (2nd Sess. 1970).
46
See H.R. 68, 92nd Cong. (1st Sess. 1971). Thomas Abernethy (D-Miss.), who introduced the bill, would retire at
the end of the 92nd Congress. William Nicholas (D-Ala.) introduced a similar bill, see H.R. 2352. 92nd Cong. (1st
Sess. 1971) as did William Edwards (R-Ala.), see H.R. 5350 92nd Cong. (1st Sess. 1971). Edwards would introduce
similar bills in the 93rd Congress (1973-1975) and in the 94th Congress. See H.R. 1394, 93rd Cong. (1st Sess. 1973);
H.R. 3225, 94th Cong. (1st Sess. 1975).
47
See Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C. B. 587.
48
See Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158.
49
See United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort–1974; Volume III:
To Ensure Equal Educational Opportunity (1975) reprinted in Tax Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. On Oversight of the House Comm. On Ways & Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 217-220 (1979)
[hereinafter 1979 House Hearings]; id. at 4 (Jerome Kurtz, IRS Commissioner).
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plaintiffs similarly challenged the adequacy of the IRS’ enforcement procedures, and the district
court would eventually order the two cases consolidated.50
In response to the lawsuits, the IRS proposed new guidelines in August 1978, but
withdrew them after a storm of protest by private-school parents, religious groups, and others.51
Several members of Congress introduced bills to prevent the IRS from finalizing the guidelines
proposed in August 1978.52 After receiving comments and public testimony, the IRS in February
1979 issued new guidelines that were weaker than those proposed in August 1978, but stronger
than existing guidelines.53 Under the new guidelines, schools formed in connection with public
school desegregation and that had insignificant minority enrollment would now have to make a
special showing to rebut a presumption of racial discrimination.54 The regulations allowed a safe
harbor for schools with minority enrollment of 20%.
Opposition by some members in Congress to the IRS’ new guidelines intensified in 1979.
Members introduced bills to prevent the IRS from implementing the new guidelines or to more
broadly curb the IRS’ power to deny schools tax-exempt status in the absence of a judicial
finding of discrimination.55 In February 1979, the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House
Ways and Means Committee held a hearing in which representatives complained that the new
guidelines placed too great a burden on private schools to disprove discrimination.56 Many
members made clear that they did not approve of racial discrimination, with some emphasizing
that the IRS had authority to withdraw tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory schools as it
had done in 1970.57 But the 1979 guidelines, several members complained, went further than
merely mandating nondiscrimination and effectively required quotas or affirmative action.58
Although a minority voice on this issue, Senator Strom Thurmond called into question the IRS’
power to take any action on racial discrimination without congressional authorization.59
Witnesses and members of Congress also raised concerns about the potential burden on religious
schools, as some denominations had few black members.60 Other representatives and witnesses
were supportive of the IRS’ guidelines.61 Some civil rights groups called for the stronger
guidelines that the IRS had initially suggested in August 1978.62

50

See Wright v. Regan, 65 F.2d 820, 822-26 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (detailing history of the cases).
See 43 Fed. Reg. 37296-37298 (1978); Stuart Taylor Jr., Tax Exemption Ruling: An Old Question Still Lingers,
N.Y. Times, June 14, 1983, at B.16 [hereinafter An Old Question].
52
See, e.g., S. 103, 96th Cong., (1st Sess. 1979).
53
See Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools, 44 Fed. Reg. 9451-9455 (1979).
54
See id. at 9452.
55
See, e.g., S. 990, 96th Cong. (1st Sess. 1979); S.995, 96th Cong., (1st Sess. Apr. 1979); H.R. 96, 96th Cong. (1st Sess.
1979).
56
See, e.g., 1979 House Hearings, supra note 49, at 255 (Rep. Gradison, R-Ohio); id. at 305 (Rep. Butler, R-Va.),
id. at 312 (Rep. Goldwater, R-Calif.); id. at 318-19 (Rep. Hansen, R-Idaho).
57
See id. at 1261 (Rep. Edwards, R-Ala.); id. at 1262 (Rep. Evans, D-Ind.).
58
See id. at 304 (Rep. Butler, R-Va.) and id. at 1261 (Rep. Edwards, R-Ala.).
59
See id. at 586 (Sen. Thurmond, R-S.C.).
60
See id. at 280-89, 299-301 (BJU attorney William Ball); id. at 312 (Rep. Gradison, R-Ohio); id. at 331-35 (Rep.
Rudd, R-Ariz.).
61
See id. at 390-93 (Rep. Ford, D-Tenn.); id. at 310-12 (Rep. Edwards, D-Calif.).
62
See, e.g., id. at 461-67 (statement of Bill Lann Lee (Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.)).
51
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The Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Committee on
Finance held its own hearing on April 1979. Chairman Robert Byrd of West Virginia (D-W.Va.)
(a former member the KKK) set the tone for the hearing, decrying the IRS for having exceeded
its statutory authority and casting the new guidance as a “threat” to the “diversity” represented
by private schools.63 Providing equal educational opportunities was a laudable goal, Bryd stated,
but the IRS regulations went beyond equal opportunity to in effect require “racial quotas.”64
Other senators echoed Bryd’s arguments.65 By the time of this hearing, the Bob Jones and
Goldsboro cases had been decided in the trial court, and a significant portion of the hearing was
devoted to testimony by senators and witnesses on the specific burdens that the regulations posed
to religious schools.66 Like the House, the Senate also heard testimony from witnesses
supporting the IRS policy.67
Later in 1979, Congress adopted two amendments to the 1980 appropriations bill that
prevented the IRS from enforcing the new regulations. One amendment, introduced by
Representative Robert Dornan (R-Calif.), prohibited the IRS from using appropriated funds to
enforce the 1978 and 1979 IRS guidelines.68 Representative John Ashbrook (R-Ohio) introduced
an amendment barring the IRS from using appropriated funds to “formulate or carry out any rule,
policy, procedure, guideline, regulation, standard, or measure which would cause the loss of taxexempt status to private, religious or church operated schools under Section 501(c)(3) unless in
effect prior to August 22, 1978.”69
In the floor debates, most supporters of the Dornan and Ashbrook amendments focused
their concerns on the 1978 and 1979 IRS guidelines, and did not explicitly question the IRS’
earlier rules.70 The House committee report accompanying the 1980 appropriations act
emphasized that the IRS’ role was to enforce and clarify tax laws, “not to expand them,”
suggested that the 1978/79 guidelines might be inconsistent with legislative intent, and urged

63

Tax Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Taxation & Debt Management of the
Senate Comm. On Finance, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 18 (1979) (Sen. Byrd, D-W.Va.).
64
Id. at 18-19.
65
See, e.g., id. at 24 (Sen. Jepsen, R-Iowa); id. at 47 (Sen. Helms, R-N.C.).
66
See, e.g., id. at 19 (Sen. Hatch, R-Utah); id. at 21 (Sen. Laxalt, R-Nev.); id. at 94-176.
67
See, e.g., id. at 64 (Arthur Flemming, Chairman, United States Commission on Civil Rights); id. at 73 (Eric
Schnapper, Staff Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense Fund).
68
See Section 615 of the Treasury Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-74, 93 Stat. 577 [hereinafter 1980 Appropriations Act].
69
Section 103 of the 1980 Appropriations Act, 93 Stat. 562.
70
See, e.g., 125 Cong. Rec. 18815 (1979) (Rep. Dornan, R-Calif., stating that his “amendment will not affect
existing IRS rules which IRS has used to revoke tax exemptions of white segregated academies under Revenue
Ruling 71-447 and Revenue Procedure 75-50.”); id. (Rep. Miller, R-Ohio, indicating that the “IRS already has
significant authority to act, and indeed, has done so in the past where evidence of discrimination exists”); id. at
18817 (Rep. Luken, D-Ohio, that the IRS should use existing guidelines rather than shift the burden to schools to
prove nondiscrimination); id. at 18446 (Rep. Ashbrook, R-Ohio, that his “amendment very clearly indicates on its
face that all the regulations in existence as of August 22, 1978, would not be touched,” and stating that the IRS “can
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further study by Congress.71 More than three-quarters of House members voted for the Ashbrook
amendment.72 In the Senate, the amendment was adopted by only four votes.73
An additional congressional action that did not directly involve private schools would
eventually feature in the Bob Jones litigation as well. In 1976, Congress passed a law denying
tax-exempt status to social clubs if their charter, bylaws, or written policy statements allowed
“discrimination against any person on the basis of race, color, or religion.”74 The district court
had ruled that discriminatory social clubs could receive tax-exempt status, and Congress’ action
effectively disapproved of that decision.75 The Senate and House committee reports
accompanying the bill included a footnote citing Green’s holding (affirmed by the Supreme
Court) that racial discrimination “is inconsistent with an educational institution’s tax-exempt
status, and also with its status as a charitable contribution donee.” The reports then stated that
“[i]n view of national policy, it is believed that it is inappropriate for a social club” that
discriminates in written policy to receive tax-exempt status.76
THE BOB JONES AND GOLDSBORO LITIGATION IN THE LOWER COURTS
As Congress and the Treasury Department debated the tax-exemption policy in the
1970s, the Bob Jones and Goldsboro cases would wind their way to the Supreme Court.
GOLDSBORO CHRISTIAN SCHOOL
It is unclear whether Goldsboro Christian School in Goldsboro, North Carolina, would
have embraced the description of “segregation academy.” Dr. Ed Ulrich, pastor of the Second
Baptist Church in Goldsboro, helped found the school in 1963 on the eve of school desegregation
in Wayne County, North Carolina, a county whose population was more than half AfricanAmerican, and by 1973 Goldsboro had a student enrollment of 750 students, from kindergarten
through twelfth grade.77
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From its inception, the school forbade the admission of black students, maintaining that
God “separated mankind into various nations and races,” and that such separation “should be
preserved in the fear of the Lord.”78 Several founders opposed the Supreme Court’s rulings on
racial integration, and at least one source describes Goldsboro Baptist and other fundamentalist
churches as the central and most enduring opponents of school integration in Goldsboro.79
Moreover, despite their claims that segregation was a matter of faith, Goldsboro did not separate
all races, only blacks.80 Still, many of the school’s founders would deny that their aim was to
resist desegregation, instead claiming disapproval of the “deteriorating moral climate” of public
schools and the Supreme Court’s decision forbidding prayer in public school as factors
motivating the school’s creation.81
BOB JONES UNIVERSITY (BJU)
The Reverend Robert Reynolds Jones founded his university in 1927 well before the
racial changes of the 1950s and before the expansion of Christian Protestant evangelicalism in
the 1960s and 1970s. Born in 1883 on a small farm in Dale County, Alabama, Bob Jones was
fourteen when he hosted his first evangelical meeting. By age fifteen he was licensed to preach
in the Methodist Church. He preached throughout the Deep South, conducting meetings and
revivals in churches, tents, or specially constructed tabernacles.82 By 1927, Bob Jones was one of
the most successful and famous evangelists in America.83
Bob Jones University was an antidote to the corrupting influence of secular education,
seeking to combine religion with “high cultural and academic standards.”84 Founded in Florida,
BJU moved to Greenville, South Carolina, in the late 1940s, where it incorporated as “an
eleemosynary corporation” on November 20, 1952. Successive generations of Jones sons have
headed the institution. In May 1948, Bob Jones Jr. became president of the university, and Bob
Jones III followed him in 1971.
The articles of incorporation announce the school’s purpose: “to conduct an institution or
institutions of learning for the general education of Youth in the essentials of culture and its arts
and sciences giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy
Scriptures.”85 At the time of the litigation, BJU included students from kindergarten through
graduate school, and enrolled 5,000 students.86
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From its inception, the school excluded black students.87 The asserted reason was that the
Bible forbade the “intermingling” of the races. In public pronouncements, BJU took some care to
distinguish between separation of the races and racism. Slavery and denial of educational access
for blacks were wrong, and born-again Christians of all races could co-exist peacefully. Only
racial mixing violated the scripture.88
LOWER COURT RULINGS
BJU’s tax troubles began in 1970 when the IRS announced that it would not maintain tax
exemptions for private schools with racially discriminatory educational policies. In response to a
November 30, 1970, IRS letter asking BJU to submit information about its admissions policy,
the university informed the IRS that it did not admit blacks and that it would not change its
policy.
The IRS initiated proceedings to revoke BJU’s tax-exempt status and to hold it liable for
unpaid taxes due under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) and the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA).89 Claiming that the IRS’ actions were unlawful and would
violate its constitutional rights of free exercise, freedom of association, due process, and equal
protection, BJU sued to enjoin the IRS’ actions. The district court for the District of South
Carolina issued a preliminary injunction,90 which was then reversed by the court of appeals.91 In
May 1974, the Supreme Court in Bob Jones v. Simon upheld the Fourth Circuit’s decision,
holding that the Anti-Injunction Act92 prohibited BJU from suing until the IRS had actually
collected the taxes.93
On April 16, 1975, the IRS revoked BJU’s tax-exempt status, effective back to December
1, 1970. To challenge this action consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Simon, BJU
paid FUTA taxes of $21 on one employee. After the IRS denied its request for a refund, BJU
brought suit against the IRS to contest the revocation of its tax-exempt status. The IRS
counterclaimed in the lawsuit for back taxes in the amount of $490,000.
As the controversy progressed, BJU changed its policy of denying admission to all
blacks. In September 1973, the university allowed any black staff member of the university
employed for four or more years to enroll. In May 1975, a month after the IRS revoked its taxexempt status and after the Fourth Circuit ruled that a private school’s denial of admissions to
blacks violated section 1981,94 BJU again changed its policy, to permit blacks to enroll. But the
87
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university still forbade interracial marriages or dating.95 These changes did not alter the IRS’
decision regarding BJU’s tax status, as the IRS contended that the dating policy constituted an
“integral part” of BJU’s admissions policies.96
The bench trial concluded in a victory for BJU. District Judge Robert Chapman found
that BJU was a religious, not an educational, institution; thus the IRS’ procedure for denying taxexempt status to racially discriminatory schools was inapplicable.97 Even if BJU were an
educational institution, the court reasoned, its refusal to allow interracial dating and marriage
were religious practices protected from government intrusion by the Free Exercise Clause.98
Chapman was unpersuaded by the IRS’ statutory argument, contending that the statute contained
no additional public-policy requirement and that BJU had satisfied the statutorily enumerated
requirements.99
Nine months earlier, in a case involving Goldsboro Christian School, a federal district
court in North Carolina had come to the opposite conclusion, holding that the IRS’ taxexemption denial was consistent with the statute, and did not violate the constitution.100 In his
ruling, Judge Robert Witherspoon Hemphill adopted the IRS’ argument—essentially the one
articulated by Judge Leventhal in Green—that organizations violating “clearly established”
public policy were not “charitable” within the meaning of the statute.”101 Hemphill also rejected
Goldsboro’s claim that the IRS’ construction violated the First Amendment, finding any burden
on free exercise justified by the government’s secular, overriding interest in combating racial
discrimination in education.102
Bob Jones arrived at the Fourth Circuit before Goldsboro.103 Over a dissent, the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling. Relying on Judge Leventhal’s Green opinion, the
court ruled that tax-exempt charities must operate consistently with public policy and that
established federal policy prohibited racial discrimination in schools.104 The Fourth Circuit also
relied on two decisions unavailable to the Green court. The first was the Supreme Court’s
holding in Norwood v. Harrison that Mississippi’s practice of lending textbooks to racially
discriminatory private schools was unconstitutional state action.105 The second was Runyon v
McCrary, where the Supreme Court held that racial discrimination in private-school admissions
violated section 1981.106 While Runyon did not reach the question of section 1981’s applicability
95
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to religious schools, the Fourth Circuit relied on Runyon as well as Brown to find that the
government interest in eradicating discrimination was sufficiently compelling to justify any
burden revocation of tax-exempt status might place on BJU.107
Dissenting from the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Bob Jones, Judge Widener agreed with
the district court that BJU was a religious institution not covered by the IRS’ ruling.108 Widener
also rejected the majority’s reading of the statute. Section 501(c)(3) allowed exemptions for
religious or charitable organizations; Congress had made no explicit reference to the commonlaw requirements of charitable trust in the statute, and the IRS lacked the power to take away a
benefit granted by Congress. Whatever public policy could be found against forbidding
discrimination in private schools could not be said to apply to religious schools. Indeed, the 1964
Civil Rights Act itself exempted some private clubs and religious organizations, and Runyon left
open the question of section 1981’s applicability to religious schools.109 Widener also relied on
Congress’ adoption of the Ashbrook amendment forbidding the IRS from adopting rules
governing private schools.110 For Widener, this was an instance of an agency using its power
unfairly against a small, religious organization based on the group’s unpopular beliefs.111 The
power to tax was the power to destroy, Widener wrote, invoking the famous phrase of M’Culloch
v. Maryland: The very existence of religious organizations was at stake.112
Following the circuit precedent created by Bob Jones, a separate panel of the Fourth
Circuit summarily affirmed the lower court several months later in Goldsboro Christian Schools
v. United States.113
IN THE SUPREME COURT
When the Supreme Court granted review of Bob Jones v. United States and Goldsboro
Christian Schools v. United States on October 13, 1981, it had been more than ten years since the
IRS first issued its announcement that it would no longer allow tax exemptions for private
schools that practiced racial segregation. There was now a substantial history of congressional
debate on the question of tax exemptions and private schools. Social and legal understandings of
school desegregation had changed. In the early 1970s, the era of formal segregation was still
fresh, and the Supreme Court’s case law requiring desegregation was at its high-water mark.114
By 1981, federal enforcement of school desegregation was politically contested. The racial
origins of the Christian academies that replaced the segregation academies were obscure.
Desegregation remedies were politically unpopular even though social norms had changed to
make explicit advocacy of segregation unacceptable. The country had moved to the right,
107

See Bob Jones Univ., 639 F.2d at 153-54. The Fourth Circuit found the government’s interest compelling both as
to BJU’s policy denying admission to blacks, as well as its policy forbidding interracial marriage and dating. Id. at
153.
108
See id. at 156.
109
See id. at 162.
110
See id. at 160-61.
111
See id. at 157.
112
See id. at 159 (citing M’Culloch v. Md., 4 Wheat. 316 (1819)).
113
See Goldsboro Christian Sch. Inc. v. United States, 644 F.2d 879 (unpub. order) (4th Cir. 1981).
114
See Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (finding “freedom of choice” plan
unconstitutional); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (allowing remedies including busing to
remove indicia of a segregated school system).

15 OLATI JOHNSON

signaled by Governor Reagan’s defeat of President Carter and the installation of a Republican
majority in the Senate in 1980. (Religious fundamentalists like Bob Jones were instrumental in
both coups.) These changes in the social and political climate provided a dramatic backdrop for
the Court’s consideration of Bob Jones.
PRE-ARGUMENT TURMOIL
The change in the presidency would produce the most dramatic events surrounding the
Bob Jones litigation in the Supreme Court. The government’s certiorari brief in Bob Jones and
Goldsboro, filed nine months after President Reagan came into office, argued that there was no
conflict in the circuits and that the Fourth Circuit decisions revoking the schools’ tax-exempt
status were correct. However the government did not oppose the granting of certiorari, because
some schools were resisting the IRS policy and review by the Supreme Court would settle the
law.115 By the time the merits brief was filed in the case six months later, however, the
government had reversed its position, arguing now that the IRS lacked power to revoke the
schools’ tax-exempt status.
After the Court accepted the cases in September 1981, Deputy Solicitor General
Lawrence Wallace, a veteran of the Office of Solicitor General (SG) since 1968, planned to
continue the Carter administration position supporting the IRS policy. Solicitor General Rex Lee
had recused himself because he had served as counsel in a similar case involving the Mormon
Church, rendering Wallace the official decision-maker in the Bob Jones and Goldsboro appeals.
As Wallace began to draft his merits brief that autumn, storm clouds were gathering.
Mississippi Congressman Trent Lott, an emerging star in the Republican Party, wrote letters to
the Solicitor General’s Office and the Treasury Department urging them to change the
government’s position, which he argued was “completely contrary to the repeated declarations of
the Congress.”116 Lott framed his argument in terms of rule-of-law and separation-of-powers
values: The IRS’ action amounted to “unwarranted interference” in private conduct, was not
authorized by Congress, and violated the Constitution’s prescription “that the Congress is to
make the laws—not appointed officials.”117
Lott’s entreaties found an audience within the Reagan administration. Many
administration officials had actively opposed the Carter administration’s civil rights policies on
issues such as desegregation and affirmative action.118 President Reagan’s campaign materials
had opposed the IRS’ attempt to remove BJU’s tax exemption. The 1980 Republican platform
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had pledged to “halt the unconstitutional regulatory vendetta launched by Mr. Carter’s IRS
commissioner against independent schools.”119
When Wallace circulated his draft brief, Assistant Attorney General (for Civil Rights)
William Bradford Reynolds and other executive-department officials mounted an effort to
change the IRS’ position. Reynolds had generated controversy soon after his appointment in
opposing what he called “involuntary busing.”120 Like Lott, Reynolds, and other opponents
framed the issue as one of honoring legislative intent and limiting judicial and agency power.
Justice and Treasury Department opponents of the IRS’ policy also argued that the IRS lacked a
legislative basis for its position, and that providing the IRS power to determine “public policy”
had no logical stopping point.121
By early January 1982, over the objections of Lawrence Wallace, top officials in the
Justice Department and Treasury agreed to change the government’s position in the cases.122
Apparently, President Reagan himself made the final decision,123 although it is not clear that he
understood the legal arguments or their implications.124 On January 8, 1982, two days before the
government’s brief was due, the administration issued a news release: The IRS would no longer
revoke the charitable status of “religious, charitable, or scientific organizations on the grounds
that they don’t conform with certain fundamental public policies.”125 Only Congress had power
to resolve the question of the tax-exempt status of discriminatory private schools. The
administration indicated that it would restore Bob Jones’ and Goldsboro’s tax exemptions and
thereby moot the cases before the Supreme Court.
The change in position provoked a “widespread outcry” from civil rights groups—the
NAACP’s leader called the decision “criminal”—as well as from top Democrats who
characterized it as “part of a pattern of capitulation to segregationists.”126 A month later, 200
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employees of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, including half of its attorneys, sent
Reynolds a letter protesting the change in policy.127
On January 12, 1982, the president issued a statement that he was “unalterably opposed
to racial discrimination in any form” and would not knowingly contribute to any organization
that supports racial discrimination. The new tax policy was based upon Reagan’s “opposition to
administrative agencies exercising powers that the Constitution assigns to the Congress.”128 The
“right thing to do” would be “to enact legislation prohibiting tax exemption for organizations that
discriminate on the basis of race.” On January 18, the president transmitted a draft of proposed
legislation to the Congress.129
Defending the president’s position, administration officials insisted that the key issue was
agency authority, not approval of race discrimination.130 The Fourth Circuit’s interpretation
would permit the IRS to make public policy in areas in which public norms were less settled,
such as attempting to revoke the tax-exempt status of women’s colleges, requiring religious
organizations to ordain women, or denying tax-exempt status to hospitals that perform
abortions.131
Yet the administration’s bill met a hostile reception in Congress. Civil rights groups,
most Democrats, and some Republicans opposed the bill, believing it unnecessary because the
IRS already had authority to deny tax exemptions to segregated schools. Conservative groups, on
the other hand, were angered by the bill, seeing it as a betrayal.132
While the government and the schools sought to dismiss the case as moot, other events
would assure that the case remained alive. On February 18, 1982, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Wright v. Regan enjoined the Treasury Department and the IRS from
granting or restoring tax-exempt status to schools that discriminated on the basis of race or that
failed to maintain racially nondiscriminatory policies as defined by Green.133 As a result, the
administration agreed that the Bob Jones case was not moot, and filed its merits brief, arguing
that the IRS’ interpretation of section 501(c)(3) was incorrect. The brief agreed with the Fourth
Circuit that the IRS policy did not violate the Establishment Clause. Dismayed by the White
House’s highjacking the case, Lawrence Wallace initially refused to sign the brief. Ultimately,
Rex Lee brokered a compromise in which Wallace signed the brief, but with a footnote stating
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that the “Acting Solicitor General fully subscribes to the position set forth on question number
two, only,” the constitutional question.134
At the suggestion of Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Supreme Court on April 19, 1982,
appointed William Coleman as amicus curiae in support of the Fourth Circuit’s judgment.135 A
respected lawyer and head of the Washington office of O’Melveny & Myers, Coleman was an
African-American graduate of Harvard Law School, had clerked for Justice Frankfurter, served
as secretary of Transportation under Gerald Ford, and was the chair of the board of the NAACP
Legal Defense & Education Fund (LDF).
The LCCR, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the NAACP, LDF, and other
civil rights organizations submitted briefs urging the Court to uphold the decision of the Fourth
Circuit. The National Association of Independent Schools, an association of 900 private
elementary and secondary schools, agreed that tax-exempt status should be denied to racially
discriminatory schools. Religious groups weighed in on both sides: While the American Jewish
Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B’Nai B’rith filed briefs supporting the
revocation, the American Baptist Church, the United Presbyterian Church, and the National
Jewish Commission on Law & Public Affairs supported BJU. Trent Lott filed a brief in support
of Bob Jones, repeating many of the arguments he had presented in his letters to Reagan officials
in 1981.
ORAL ARGUMENT
On October 13, 1982, the day of the oral argument, a line formed early outside the Court.
By 10 a.m., the courtroom was packed with public spectators, media, and the Supreme Court
bar.136 Despite the crowds and media interest, the political turmoil did not feature explicitly in
the oral arguments. Indeed, the justices asked fewer questions than usual, concentrating their
inquiry not on the First Amendment implications of the case, but on the question of statutory
construction.
William B. Ball (a graduate of Notre Dame University) argued on behalf of Bob Jones.
Arguing before the Supreme Court, Ball had defended the constitutionality of religious schools
receiving state aid and represented Amish parents with religious objections to sending their
children to public school.137 The bench was quiet as Ball presented his argument that the IRS
lacked statutory authority for its position, and that a contrary ruling would violate the First
Amendment. As Ball prepared to sit down, he was finally asked two questions, both of which
suggested the justices had focused early on questions of statutory authority. Would Ball concede
that Congress could authorize an exemption? Yes, he did. Did the 1976 legislation denying tax134
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exempt status to discriminatory social clubs amount to “congressional adoption” of the Green
position? Ball answered no; that legislation was a “very unclear affirmation” of Green.138
The justices subjected William McNairy, the lawyer for Goldsboro Christian School, to
slightly more intensive questioning. A graduate of William and Mary Law School, McNairy
practiced tax law in Greensboro, North Carolina. His argument focused on the history and
structure of section 501(c)(3). The eight categories of organizations exempted from taxation,
McNairy argued, were connected by the disjunctive “or,” giving each term a “separate and
distinct meaning.” Satisfaction of any one of the requirements qualified an organization for a tax
exemption, and the legislative history provided no support for the notion that Congress intended
to suffuse the tax code with the broader common-law meaning of charitable.139
Representing the United States, William Bradford Reynolds also focused on the statutory
arguments. Didn’t section 170 incorporate the common-law meaning of charitable? No, replied
Reynolds, the meaning of “charitable” in sections 170 and 501(c)(3) were the same, and neither
meant to embrace the common law. But if “charitable” in section 501(c)(3) meant organizations
that provided relief to the poor, wasn’t section 170(c)’s use of “charitable” meant more broadly?
No, said Reynolds. Section 170’s use of the term “charitable” was meant to include all
organizations listed in section 501(c)(3) as presumptively charitable.140
Next was William Coleman arguing as amicus curiae. Coleman emphasized
congressional ratification of the IRS’ decision. Congress had held more hearings “on this issue
than perhaps any other issue in Congress,” yet “made no change.”141 Coleman pointed out that
numerous bills to reverse the IRS’ interpretation never emerged from committee. And when
Congress in 1976 denied tax-exempt status to discriminatory social clubs, it was careful not to
dislodge existing case law forbidding tax exemptions to racially discriminatory fraternal
lodges.142 Some of the questions from the bench reflected skepticism about the theory of
legislative ratification as well as the extent of agency power. Congress didn’t actually amend the
statute to prohibit exemptions for tax-exempt schools did it?143 Justice Powell asked: What was
the principle limiting the IRS’ ability to determine public policy?144
OPINION
On May 24, 1983, the Supreme Court ruled 8-1 that the IRS had statutory authority to
deny tax exemptions to racially discriminatory religious schools and that such action did not
violate the First Amendment.
Chief Justice Burger began the majority decision with an appeal to section 501(c)(3)’s
purpose. “It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that a court should go beyond
138
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the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the
statute.”145 The statutory purpose was to codify the common-law notions of charity—a purpose
that makes sense of Congress’ deployment of section 170 for “charitable” contributions only.
(Unfortunately, section 170 defines charitable contributions with reference to the same list used
in section 501(c)(3). Also, the provisions were enacted at different times: Section 501(c)(3)
originated in the 1894 income-tax statute, while Congress enacted section 170 in 1917.146)
The Court then concluded that the legislative history of the original charitable provision,
as well as subsequent enactments and amendments, show that Congress intended to adopt the
common-law requirement that tax-exempt organizations provide a public benefit.147 Most of
Chief Justice Burger’s evidence for this point consisted of floor statements—the same type of
legislative history that he discounted as “scattered” in minimizing the importance of the
Ashbrook amendments. His best evidence came from the House committee report accompanying
the Revenue Act of 1938, which justified tax exemptions on the public-welfare benefits served
by charitable organizations.148
As a corollary to the public-benefit principle, the Court found that charitable trusts cannot
be “illegal or violate established public policy.”149 Thus, tax-exempt institutions’ purpose must
“not be so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any public benefit
that might otherwise be conferred.”150 Relying on Supreme Court cases, federal legislation, and
executive action and pronouncements, the Court easily found a compelling public policy in
eradicating racial discrimination in public institutions and practices.151 Whether Chief Justice
Burger would find that this public policy explicitly extended to racial discrimination in private
schools, much less to religious schools, is less clear. Chief Justice Burger’s opinion noted that
Norwood dealt with a “nonpublic institution,” but failed to discuss Runyon v. McCrary.
Interestingly, prior drafts of Chief Justice Burger’s opinion were more forceful. The final
opinion states that “[o]ver the past quarter of a century, ‘every pronouncement of this Court,
myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders attest a firm national policy to prohibit racial
segregation and discrimination in public education.” But Chief Justice Burger’s first draft added
that national policy also “discourage[d] such practices in nonpublic education.”152 Invoking
Norwood, the first draft concluded, “decisions of this Court firmly establish that racially
discriminatory private schools are contrary to a most deeply held public policy.”153 This sentence
was not included in the final opinion, which said instead, “Whatever may be the rationale for
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such private schools’ policies, and however sincere the rationale may be, racial discrimination in
education is contrary to public policy.”154
Chief Justice Burger also rejected the claim that the IRS had exceeded its authority.
Congress had long given the IRS discretion to interpret the code in light of changing conditions,
and discretion was properly exercised here where the policy of all three branches was clear.155
The opinion was untroubled that the IRS’ decision was not the result of internal deliberation, but
rather came only after a three-judge panel issued a preliminary injunction in the Green case.156
Chief Justice Burger’s final statutory argument was that Congress ratified the decision.
While courts should not accord significance to Congress’ failure to act, this was no “ordinary
claim of legislative acquiescence.” Here, the chief justice contended, Congress’ “nonaction was
significant.” Congress had held numerous hearings on the IRS policy; members had introduced
more than thirteen bills to overturn the IRS’ interpretation, but none emerged from committee
(even as other changes were made to section 501). These events, Chief Justice Burger concluded,
provided “evidence of Congressional approval” of the IRS policy.
Chief Justice Burger put particular reliance on Congress’ passage of section 501(i)—the
social clubs provision. Section 501(i) showed that Congress could have explicitly prohibited tax
exemptions for private religious schools, and so, as a matter of pure text, section 501(i)
supported Bob Jones. But Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the committee reports for section
501(i) found that Green had “made clear that racially discriminatory schools should not receive
tax-exemptions.” In section 501(i), “Congress affirmatively manifested its acquiescence in the
IRS policy.” In Chief Justice Burger’s view the Ashbrook and Dornan amendments revealed
only congressional opposition to more stringent substantive standards against private schools.157
Was ratification the result of congressional silence or of Congress’ positive actions? In
the first draft, Chief Justice Burger had written that the references to Green in the legislative
record of section 501(i) cannot be read “other than as indicating acquiescence in the standards
then being applied to racially discriminatory private schools.”158 By the final draft, however,
“acquiescence” had become “approval.”159
With the bulk of the opinion devoted to the statutory question, Chief Justice Burger’s
opinion summarily rejected Bob Jones’ argument that applying the policy to religious schools
violates the Free Exercise Clause. The government had a compelling interest in eradicating racial
discrimination that outweighed any free-exercise burdens on religious schools.160 The IRS’
policy was properly applied to BJU, the Court concluded, as prior case law made clear that bans
on interracial marriage and dating constituted a form of racial discrimination.161
JUSTICE POWELL’S CONCURRENCE
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Prior to oral argument, Justice Powell had seemed skeptical of the ratification theory,
writing in his notes that silence on a politically hot issue may not constitute ratification and that
if Congress had meant to approve the result in Green when it enacted the social clubs provision,
“Why didn’t it say so[?]”162 Justice Powell emerged from conference prepared to uphold the
IRS’ policy, but was unconvinced by the chief justice’s statutory argument.163 Yet Justice Powell
found Coleman’s argument on congressional ratification persuasive.164 After Chief Justice
Burger circulated his first draft, Justice Powell responded that he would concur in the judgment
and in part III of the Court’s opinion. “Whether one calls it ratification or acquiescence, I do
think it clear—certainly as of now—that Congress has accepted the original ruling that racially
discriminatory schools do not qualify for tax exemptions.”165
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell disapproved of the majority’s interpretation of
section 501(c)(3). A problem with the majority’s opinion was its emphasis on harmony with the
public interest, which in Justice Powell’s view ignored the role charitable exemptions play in
supporting diverse, conflicting viewpoints, and preventing orthodoxy.166 If writing on a “blank
slate,” Justice Powell would have rejected the Court’s conclusion that the statute gave the IRS
the power to decide which charities violate public policy.167 But Justice Powell found a “decade
of acceptance that is persuasive in the circumstances of this case.” This history provided “an
unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence in and ratification by implication of the 1970
and 1971 rulings.” Justice Powell found particularly convincing Congress’ enactment of section
501(i), which was an explicit move by Congress to align the policy on social clubs with the
policy on private schools.168
JUSTICE REHNQUIST’S DISSENT
At conference, Justice Rehnquist announced that he would not vote to uphold the IRS’
interpretation.169 In his solo dissent, Justice Rehnquist agreed with the majority’s resolution of
the First Amendment question, but argued that the majority’s opinion ignored the statutory
language. The statute was quite clear. Section 501(c)(3)’s plain language delineated all the
categories warranting tax exemption, leaving no room for an “additional, undefined publicpolicy requirement.”170 That there were successive amendments of the statute broadening the list
of tax-exempt organizations made clear that Congress did not intend to adopt the common-law
standard.171 Section 170(c)’s use of the term “charitable contribution” was unhelpful, for section
170(a)(1) defined charitable contribution by listing the categories exempt under section
501(c)(3).
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Where the majority saw an “unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence,” Justice
Rehnquist saw only that a “vigorous debate has existed in Congress concerning the new IRS
position.”172 Congress’ adoption of section 501(i) demonstrated that Congress could have been
explicit about prohibiting racial discrimination through the tax code but had chosen not to. The
legislative history of the Ashbrook and Dornan amendments contained numerous statements that
the IRS lacked power to make public policy. Bob Jones was a particularly weak case for
ratification, because the IRS policy was not longstanding, was at odds with its prior positions,
unsupported by the statutory language and legislative history, and had led to “considerable
controversy in and out of Congress.”173 Like the Reagan administration, Justice Rehnquist agreed
that Congress could have adopted legislation without infringing on the constitutional rights of
religious schools. But “Congress has failed to do so. Whatever the reasons for the failure, this
Court should not legislate for Congress.”174
THE AFTERMATH OF BOB JONES
Many pundits celebrated the Bob Jones decision as a deserved defeat for the Reagan
administration, worse than an “embarrassment” in the words of one journalist, a “humiliation.”175
The New York Times wrote: “Tax-Exempt Hate, Undone” and “President Reagan and the lawyers
he has put in charge of protecting civil rights should stand ashamed.”176 The Washington Post’s
editorial page described the Reagan administration’s position as a “disastrous legal and political
blunder.”177 Civil rights groups hailed the decision.178 The relationship between civil rights
groups and the Reagan administration would forever be defined, and poisoned, by the bitter
contest over the IRS’ authority to deny tax benefits to discriminatory institutions.179 In
subsequent months, the administration continued to stoke the ire of the civil rights community by
opposing school desegregation remedies, affirmative action, regulations to combat housing
discrimination, and by replacing members of the United States Civil Rights Commission who
were critical of Reagan’s civil rights policies.180
As a matter of prediction of what the rule of law required, Deputy Solicitor General
Wallace was vindicated by the Court’s near-unanimous decision in Bob Jones. But the Reagan
administration never trusted him again.181 Although Wallace remained in the Solicitor General’s
Office long after Reagan left the presidency (retiring in January 2003),182 the structure of the
office changed. In the aftermath of Bob Jones, the Reagan administration created a new deputy
172
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solicitor general position, a political appointee who could be trusted to advance the position of
the president.183
Many in the conservative and Christian evangelical community criticized the result in
Bob Jones—blaming both the Reagan administration and the Supreme Court.184 Patrick
Buchanan blasted the decision as an infringement on religious freedom, expressing his “hope
[that] Bob Jones University has the courage to tell the federal government to go to the devil.”185
Letters poured into the Supreme Court expressing displeasure at the Court for infringing
religious rights and faulting the Court for its reasoning.186 For one letter writer, the case was a
“close second to the school prayer and Bible-banning decisions.”187 The Court’s invocation of
“public policy” and reliance on legislative inaction would come under harsh criticism from
commentators and individuals. Many letters would repeat the same line: that the decision
revealed the “danger of the Supreme Court making laws when they are specifically forbidden by
the Constitution.”188
That Bob Jones and not Goldsboro became the emblem of the Supreme Court’s decision
allowed critics of the decision to sever the IRS’ exemption policy from the historic effort to
combat segregation in public and private schools. Indeed, to some in the religious and
conservative community, Bob Jones’ policies were not discriminatory, for the school accepted
blacks and forbade only interracial dating.189 One wonders how popular perceptions of the case
might have changed had the case been styled Goldsboro v. United States. Ironically, the justices
choose to list the Bob Jones case first despite the fact that the Court had granted the certiorari
petition in Goldsboro first.190
As for the petitioners themselves, Goldsboro eventually paid its taxes, and agreed to
change its admissions policy. According to some sources a few black students eventually
enrolled in the school.191 In 1987, however, the church closed the school.192 BJU on the other
hand refused to yield, “We will never change beliefs that we base on the Word of God,” said Bob
Jones III after the Court’s ruling.193 BJU officials criticized the Court’s decision in a pamphlet to
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supporters and alumni (also sent to the justices), urging supporters to increase their giving to the
school in the wake of the decision.194
Nearly two decades later, however, BJU did change its mind. In March 2000, Bob Jones
III went on the Larry King Show and announced that BJU would permit interracial dating.195 A
statement on BJU’s website now apologizes for conforming to the “segregationist ethos of
American culture” and for failing “to accurately represent the Lord and to fulfill the
commandment to love others as ourselves.”196 Political events might have shaped BJU’s
decision. Less than a month before, BJU had been thrust into the national spotlight when George
W. Bush launched his South Carolina primary campaign at the school. His opponent, John
McCain, criticized Bush for associating with the school and for failing to denounce the school’s
interracial dating policy and anti-Catholic teachings.197 (Bush later disavowed the school’s views
on race and Catholicism.198)
After the Court’s decision, the IRS immediately denied tax exemptions to more than 100
private schools that were explicitly racist and that had refused to adopt nondiscrimination
statements. The more stringent and contested regulations proposed in 1978 and 1979 to address
schools with less explicitly discriminatory policies, however, would never be enforced. While
the Dornan and Asbhrook amendments expired in 1982, the Reagan administration’s IRS
declined to adopt the more stringent review policies.199 In 1984, the Supreme Court held that the
plaintiffs in Wright lacked standing to challenge the IRS’ process for revoking tax exemptions of
discriminatory private schools.200 The IRS continues to adhere to the 1975 procedures that
require schools to publicize a statement of nondiscrimination, and the IRS denies tax-exempt
status to schools originating in a period of desegregation that cannot demonstrate that they do not
racially discriminate in admissions, employment, and other school-related programs.201 On at
least one occasion, the IRS has revoked the exemption of a private school with a formally open
admissions policies but that lacked minority students and had a history of racial exclusion.202
Still, as the era of formal explicit, segregation recedes, the IRS’ exemption policy is likely of
little contemporary relevance.203
DOCTRINAL AND THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE
Three moves in the majority’s opinion provided an easy target for critics: the decision’s
quick hop over the plain meaning and structure of the statute, the reading of “charitable” to
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incorporate common-law notions of public policy, and the reliance on legislative ratification. In
letters to the Court and in the media, these flaws collapsed into one big point: The decision was
judge-created public policy masquerading as law. While their criticisms were less colorful, many
legal and scholarly commentators were also not persuaded by the Court’s rationale.
PLAIN MEANINGS AND PLAIN PURPOSES
It is not hard to see how the majority’s reading of 501(c)(3) strains plain meanings. The
statute offers a list of exempt organizations in the disjunctive, which would seem to allow an
organization to satisfy any one of the listed exemptions. Chief Justice Burger, perhaps, had a
stronger argument about section 170(a)’s use of the term “charitable,” but this is substantially
weakened by section 170(c)(2)(B)’s listing of several types of exempt organizations, again in the
disjunctive.
Nor is Chief Justice Burger’s self-conscious decision to ignore the literal construction of
the statute in service of the “plain purpose” fully convincing. The legislative history provides
evidence that Congress meant to require all charities to satisfy general common-law notions that
exempt institutions provide a benefit to society. Yet one might argue that these bits of legislative
history do not amount to a purpose so “plain” as to defeat the language and structure of the
statute.204 Even if the statute’s purpose were to exempt organizations serving a public benefit,
Congress might have sought to further that purpose through the list of the exempt
organizations.205
PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS
Chief Justice Burger is almost certainly correct that executive, judicial, and legislative
pronouncements establish a strong public policy against racial discrimination in education.
However, as the subtle changes to the opinion draft suggest, whether the policy against racial
discrimination existed as to private schools—much less as to religious schools—is less clear. We
cannot be sure why Chief Justice Burger’s opinion gave so little space to Norwood and why it
ignored Runyon in advancing its public-policy argument. It may be that detailing those cases
would expose the contested nature of the equality norm as applied to private schools, as well as
highlight that those cases did not answer the question of discrimination by religious schools.
Some commentators have faulted the Bob Jones Court for filtering equal protection
analysis through a questionable interpretation of the statute, thus delegitimizing the opinion and
failing to advance the equal protection norms at stake.206 The majority, of course, cites its equal
protection holdings when finding a compelling public policy at stake, and the implication of the
Court’s brief First Amendment analysis is that equal protection norms effectively trump freeexercise claims. But the Court does not hold that equal protection requires the denial of tax
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exemption, as Coleman and other amici had argued. Citing its cases on constitutional avoidance,
the Court explicitly declined to reach the issue.207
Yet, this avoidance of the constitutional dimensions does not begin with the Court.
Statutory authority became the refuge for the other key institutional players in the debate:
Congress, the IRS, and the White House. Congressional critics of the IRS policy spoke not of the
right of private schools to engage in racial discrimination, but instead argued that the IRS was
claiming power properly left to Congress. In justifying their decision to support Bob Jones and
Goldsboro, Reagan administration officials too avoided claims of religious freedom and
disavowed the racial philosophies espoused by the schools. Rather, their asserted goal in the
litigation would be the vindication of the rule of law and separation of powers. The
administration’s reactive legislative proposal to grant Congress authority to revoke tax
exemptions furthered its stance that the IRS’ position was morally correct, but lacking in
statutory authority.
LEGISLATIVE ACQUIESCENCE
To BJU’s own officials, the reliance on legislative ratification was emblematic of the
decision’s lawlessness, one in which Congress was complicit: “Congress which is answerable to
the people and must stand for election every two years, is all too glad that a court, which is not
answerable and over which people have no control through the electoral process, has done its
work for them.”208 Editorial pages lampooned the acquiescence arguments as bad for the Court
and bad for Congress. “Isn’t is possible that the legislators were not as convinced as the court
seems to be that there was an overwhelming public consensus on this issue and that this explains
why they preferred to duck it?” asked the Wall Street Journal.209 Another commentator claimed
that “this sort of jurisprudence contributes to the decay of representative institutions.”210
The Court itself conceded that legislative inaction is “not often a useful guide” and that
its decisions had long cautioned against relying on Congress’ failure to act.211 One problem with
relying on legislative inaction is that Congress’ failure to act may not indicate approval of a
particular interpretation. Constitutional and sub-constitutional rules for advancing legislation,
such as the committee system and the filibuster, often assure that it is easier to block legislation
than to enact it. Party leaders and committee chairs can control the congressional agenda in ways
that thwart the preferences of the majority of congressional members. Moreover under formal
conceptions of legislative enactment, courts should not give meaning to any legislative action or
silence that has not received approval from both chambers of Congress and been signed by the
president.212
In addition, it is unclear what legislative acquiescence is meant to reveal. The Bob Jones
Court would interpret Congress’ “nonaction” as indicating Congress’ “approval” of the IRS’
207

See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 599, n.24.
The Bomb, supra note 187, at 13.
209
Don’t Cheer So Loud, Wall St. J, May 25, 1983, at 30.
210
George F. Will, Bob Jones U: Why Didn’t Congress Act?, Wash. Post, May 29, 1983, at C7.
211
See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 600.
212
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 61, 96 (1988) (detailing
doctrinal weakness of acquiescence arguments).
208

THE STORY OF BOB JONES 28

exemption policy.213 Yet whether the interpreter is searching for the plain meaning of the statute,
or the intent or purpose behind the statute, then it would seem that the understandings and
commitments of the enacting Congress would be most relevant, and not a later Congress’ afterthe-fact approval of an agency interpretation. Moreover, in this case, Congress’ “acquiescence”
is less than clear. Congress’ inaction “frequently betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or
paralysis.”214 Congress does not speak with one voice; many in Congress spoke repeatedly and
loudly against the IRS’ policy and questioned the IRS’ ability to revoke tax exemptions without
congressional approval. The tax exemption had particularly perilous politics because of the array
of interest groups and the complex intraparty divisions. Any congressional action was likely to
provoke either the ire of tightly organized civil rights interests (supported by moderate
Republicans and most Democrats) or religious or anti-integration groups (supported by Southern
Democrats and conservative Republicans). Thus, rather than approval, the twelve-year record
shows repeated debate, reflecting contestation, and dissension on the question of tax exemptions
for racially discriminatory private schools.
If, however, implementing a supposed legislative intent is not the goal of statutory
interpretation, the enacting Congress would just provide one possible source of statutory
meaning; achieving true coherence in legislation would require that statutes be read against
contemporary commitments. Allowing tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory schools
would be at odds with contemporary norms against racial discrimination, made manifest in
numerous judicial, executive, and administrative pronouncements, including the Court’s
decisions in Norwood and Runyon.215 True, recent Congresses were conflicted in determining
how far the IRS could go in enforcing and furthering that commitment, but the core commitment
against racial segregation was well-announced.
Perhaps consideration of the full history behind the tax-exemption policy reveals another
possibility: that the Court was correct in its claim that this was an extraordinary case. The Court
placed great reliance on what it saw as Congress’ approval of Green in enacting section 501(i),
which revoked tax exemptions for racially discriminatory social clubs. What is most revealing
about the committee report is not simply its adoption of the Green rationale, but what this signals
about the committee’s understanding of Congress’ role. Congress need not legislate on
exemptions for private schools, the committee report suggests, because the IRS and the courts
have already decided the issue. In short, Congress was relying on the agency-court settlement of
the matter of tax exemptions for discriminatory schools when it extended that policy to
discriminatory social clubs. For the Supreme Court to overturn that settled understanding would
have been a deeply uncooperative interference with the legislative process, one might argue.
Similarly, the full debates on the Dornan and Ashbrook amendments signaled that a
majority in Congress was unlikely to tamper with the core commitments reflected in the IRS’
1970 decision. Many in Congress condemned racial discrimination and objected only to what
they termed quotas; few openly argued that racially discriminatory schools should receive tax
exemptions. The resort to “quotas” may, of course, suggest a shallow commitment to the
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antidiscrimination norm—one apparent in the longstanding dissonance between strong public
and political support for antidiscrimination and integration norms and profound resistance to
specific antidiscrimination remedies.216 Yet, these debates revealed that Congress was unlikely to
retreat from its support of the 1970 decision.
Last and perhaps most critical are the extraordinary events of 1981 and 1982 leading up
to the case: the immense publicity and public uproar after the Reagan administration’s change in
position; the administration’s concession that the IRS policy was correct as a matter of policy
and morality; and Congress’ unwillingness in 1982 as the case was pending to provide the IRS
explicit statutory authority to revoke the tax exemptions of private schools. If, as positive
political theory suggests, post-enactment history is relevant in revealing the intensity of
preferences of the current Congress, the Court had much information to suggest that Congress
would not have the votes to override its interpretation. As Justice Powell would write to Chief
Justice Burger, it was certainly clear “as of now” that Congress approved.
DOCTRINAL RELEVANCE
The final question may then be whether Bob Jones is too extraordinary to matter much in
statutory interpretation doctrine. The Court’s holding that tax-exempt organizations must serve a
public benefit remains good tax law, though commentators have joined Justice Powell’s critique
that the Court’s articulation of the doctrine disserves the diversity of the nonprofit sector and
gives too much discretion to the IRS to formulate public policy.217 The appropriate sources for
determining what constitutes a public policy and whether a public policy is established or
fundamental are similarly unsettled.218
But the legacy for interpretive methodology remains unclear. Many Supreme Court and
lower court cases citing Bob Jones concede the extraordinary nature of its holding and follow the
common rule that courts should not give weight to legislative inaction.219 There are cases to the
contrary, citing Bob Jones and considering congressional acquiescence in the face of Congress’
“abundant[] awar[eness]” as one factor among many in determining the meaning of the statute.220
But, even when followed, Bob Jones’ reasoning on legislative acquiescence is often grudgingly
embraced.221
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What observers have long found compelling about Bob Jones are the colorful tales of the
Reagan administration’s handling of the case. The case is often neglected in the legal canon
today, regarded as a “story about politics not law.”222 A full account of the case, however,
reveals not just an intriguing story about the Reagan administration, but also a story about the
struggle to regulate private education to achieve greater equity in public education and the proper
scope of racial remedies—all in the face of claims of religious and associational freedom. What
is extraordinary and meaningful about the case is that these rules and norms would be developed
through the interplay of all three branches of government and mediated through the meaning of
the word “charitable” in the tax code.
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